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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, EDUCATION, AND PARENTAL
RIGHTS
Richard S. Myers*

I.

INTRODUCTION 1

There have long been battles in the United States over
education. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, we
have experienced contentious battles over the proper
relationship between the state and parents in controlling the
education of children. 2 In recent years, this controversy has
played out in the area of education relating to sexual morality. 3
One of the principal emerging controversies today involves
teaching about same-sex marriage. 4
I am not sanguine about an easy solution. Fortunately, we
do not have the sort of violent controversies we had in the first
half of the nineteenth century, 5 but the current debates are
often fractious and typically result in the subordination of

* Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Lynn Wardle
for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and to the Symposium participants for
a stimulating conference.
1. I have addressed some of these issues in prior writings. See, e.g, Richard S.
Myers, The Right to Conscience and the First Amendment, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123
(2010) [hereinafter, Myers, Conscience]; l{ichard S. Myers, School Choice: The
Constitutional Issues, 8 CATH. Soc. SCI. I{EV. 167 (2003) [hereinafter Myers, School
Choice]; Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Teaching of Civic Virtue in the Public
Schools, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. I{EV. 6:3 (1996) [hereinafter Myers, Civic Virtue]; Richard
S. Myers, A Comment on the Death of Lemon, 1:3 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 90:3 (199:3);
l{ichard S. Myers, Curriculum in the Public Schools: The Need for an Emphasis on
Parental Control, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 4:31 (1990) [hereinafter Myers, Parental Control].
To avoid multiplying footnotes, I will not provide a citation in every case in which I
have drawn from my prior work.
2. Myers, Parental Control, supra note 1, at 132.
3. See, e.!{., Emily .J. Brown, Note, When Insiders Become Outsiders: Parental
Objections to Public School Sex Education Programs, 59 DUKE L. J. 109 (2009).
1. See generally Symposium, The Impact of Same-Sex Marriaue on Education,
2011 BYU Enuc. & L.J. 126 (2011).
5. See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 119 (1999).
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parental and religious rights. 6 This is troubling because my
approach to these issues begins with the presumption that
parents have the primary authority and responsibility to
control the education of their children.7
A major reason for the current situation, which I regard as
unsatisfactory, is due to some basic deficiencies in our
approach to education. We tend to view state education as the
baseline and that exceptions ought to be narrow (and perhaps
only reserved for fringe groups such as the Amish) because
exceptions threaten the public schools,s which the Supreme
Court has characterized as the symbol of our democracy. 9 This
approach fails to accord a proper respect for parental rights.
The current approach is heavily weighted towards the exercise
of state power. We need to recognize the inevitability of
compulsion in the public schools. 10 We also need to recognize
that the near monopoly of public funding for the public schools
interferes with the choices of those parents who would like to
choose private schools or home education. 11
I will begin by exploring the legal issues presented when
parents object to teaching relating to same-sex marriage in the
public schools. Despite some court decisions that have accorded
constitutional protection to parental rights in the context of
education, 12 the case law makes it clear that parents have very
little ability (at least as a matter of federal constitutional law)
to object to the public school curriculum. 13 Although this
conclusion runs against my policy preferences, I think the
current law is a proper interpretation of the relevant federal
constitutional provisions.
The federal Constitution does not provide any significant
protection for parental rights. I will explore this by examining

6. See Myers, Sehoul Choice, supra note 1, at 169.
7. See, e.g., Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 176.
8. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, :332 F.3d 1:31, 111 (2d Cir. 200:l); Brown v.
Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.:)d 525, 5:H (1st Cir. 1995).
9. The Supreme Court has characterized the public schools as "'at once the
symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common
destiny."' Edwards v. Aguillard, 182 U.S. 578, 581 (1987) (quoting McCollum v. Bel. of
Educ., :133 U.S. 20:3, 2:11 (1918)).
10. See Myers, School Choice, supra noted, at 168-69.
11. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 170-75.
12. See Wisconsin v. Yoder. 106 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 5:31 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. cl90 (192:3).
1:1. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 169-70.
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cases addressing free exercise and due process arguments. The
principal focus of the paper will be parental rights to control
their children's education. I will briefly discuss older cases, 14
but the main focus will be on recent cases such as Parker v.
Hurley. 15 These recent cases give very little protection to
parental rights. I will evaluate these developments from two
perspectives. First, I will analyze these decisions as a matter of
federal constitutional law. Second, I will discuss the problems
that this law creates and will, in conclusion, suggest how the
current, unsatisfactory situation can be improved.
Because of the deficiencies in the federal constitutional law,
it is necessary to explore other ways to protect parent choices.
One way to do this is to broaden the debate. We really need to
think more broadly about whether parents or the state ought to
have the principal control over education and we cannot do
that by narrowly focusing on the curriculum in the public
schools. We need to also think about educational funding.
Perhaps the current controversies over the contentious issue of
same-sex marriage will prompt an increased focus on these
broader issues and will lead to an increased appreciation of
parental rights, subsidiarity, and a genuine pluralism in
education.

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The government was not very active m the area of
education until the 1820s-1840s. The common school
movement of that era was a conscious effort to mold children in
the philosophy of those in charge of the educational system. 16
There was a particular concern to bring those of minority faiths
(and here the particular concern was about Catholics) into the
societal mainstream. This was enormously controversial, 17 but
after about the middle of the nineteenth century we have had a
more or less stable set of affairs. I do not want to suggest that
there were not controversies. It is true, however, that the
disputes were worked out without the influence of federal
constitutional law. The public schools have been basically

14.
15.
16.
17.

Pierce, 268 U.S. 5:l1; Meyer, 262 U.S. :l90.
511 F.:ld 87 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008).
See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 167.
!d.
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Protestant schools for most of their history. 1x There were some
controversies over religious activities in public schools and
state courts sometimes protected the rights of religious
dissenters. 19 But the main remedy for those parents who were
unhappy with the public schools was for the parents to exercise
the option of avoiding the public schools altogether. That is
why Catholic immigrants made such enormous sacrifices to
establish the parochial school system. 20
The United States Constitution did not play much of a role
in these debates until the Court incorporated the Religion
Clauses in the middle of the twentieth century. 21 The school
prayer cases of the early 1960s accelerated the move to a
secular-as opposed to a Protestant-government school
system. 22 Most of the cases have dealt with efforts to ensure
that all traces of religion are banished from the public schools.
I think that most of these cases were properly decided, in large
part because there is a very real risk of coercion in the public
school setting. 23
But to a significant degree, these cases (involving in recent
years things such as the Pledge of Allegiance and moment of
silence laws 24 ) are a distraction from the real issues presented
by an increasingly secular school system. These cases do not
deal with the most serious interferences with parental rights.
These interferences occur when parents have objected to the

18. Jd. See also .John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. l{~;v. 279. 297 (20()1) ("For most of its history,
public education in America had been unabashedly patriotic and unmistakably
Protestant.").
19. See V!TERIT'l'l, supra note 5, at 150; .Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 18, at :301.
20. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 167.
21. See l~verson v. Bd. of Educ., :3:30 U.S. 1 (1917); Cantwell v. Connecticut. :no
U.S. 296 (1910).
22. See Abington Township v. Schempp, ::374 U.S. 20:l (196:l); Engel v. Vitak :no
U.S. 421 (1962). See also Jeffries & Hyan, supra note 18, at :l18--27; Myers. School
Choice, supra note 1, at 167-68.
2:3. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 168. The courts have sometimes gone
too far. See id. (mentioning Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (graduation prayer)
and Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 5:!0 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer at high school
football games) as examples of cases that went too far in excluding ndigion from the
public schools).
21. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2:3487 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 201 0) (upholding the constitutionality of a New
Hampshire statute that requires that public schools authoriw a period during the day
for students to voluntarily recite the Pledge of Allegiann~); Sherman v. Koch. 62:3 F.:ld
501 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that requires a
mandatory period of silence in the puhlic schools).
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public schools either in whole or in part, and it 1s to these
situations that I now turn.
Supreme Court decisions in the 1920s did protect the rights
of parents to opt out of the public school system altogether and
to retain some control over private education. In Meyer u.
Nebraska, 25 the Court held unconstitutional a Nebraska
statute that made it illegal to teach a subject in a language
other than English in any school, private or public. The Court
found that the statute violated the due process clause because
it unreasonably interfered with the right of the teacher to
pursue his occupation and the rights of parents to control the
education of their children. The Court noted "[t]hat the State
may do much, go very far indeed, in order to improve the
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally[,] ...
[but also noted that] the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected." 26 Although it found a
constitutional violation in Meyer, the Court did acknowledge
"[t]he power of the State to compel attendance at some school
and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English ... :m
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 28 the Court held
unconstitutional an Oregon statute that required children
between eight and sixteen to attend public schools. The Court
found that the statute violated the due process clause because
it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." 29 Justice McReynolds stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power
of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 30

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

262 U.S. :190 (192:1).
Jd. at 101.
/d. at 102.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Jd. at 5J1-:l5.
JO. Jd. at 5:15.
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The Court, however, did not recognize an absolute due
process right of parents to control the education of their
children. The Pierce Court noted:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare. 31

In 1972, in Wisconsin u. Yoder, 32 the Court held that
Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law (which required
children between seven and sixteen to attend school) was
unconstitutional as applied to Amish parents who refused to
send their children to public schools after they completed the
eighth grade. The Court did rely on the parental rights
recognized in Meyer and Pierce, but most of the Court's focus
was on the free exercise claim presented by the Amish
parents. 33 Although the Court's ruling is considered a highwater mark of protection for free exercise of religion, 34 the
opinion was quite narrow. 35 The Court acknowledged the power
of the state to enact compulsory school-attendance laws and to
promulgate reasonable educational standards. The Court's
ruling seemed limited to the Amish.
Despite these rulings, the modern cases involving parental
rights in the area of education have generally been decided in
favor of the power of the state. I will limit myself to a few of
many examples.
In Mozert u. Hawkins County Board of Education, 36 the
district court held that a public school requirement that all

31. Jd. at 5::31.
:12. 106 .8. 205 (1972).
:3:3. See id. at 21:3-14.
:H. Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free J.:xercise of Religion, 57 CLEY. ST. L. i{EV.
49:3, 501 (2009).
:35. See Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 127. See also Parker v. Hurley, 5J!I
F.:ld. 87, 100 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Tellingly, Yoder emphasized that its holding was
essentially sui gcneris, as few sects could make a similar showing of a unique and
demanding religious way of life that is fundamentally incompatihle with any schooling
system.'').
:36. 617 F. Supp. 1191 (E. D. Tenn. 1986) (Mozert /), ret!'d, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987).

u
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students in first through eighth grades use a prescribed set of
reading textbooks violated the constitutional rights of the
objecting parents and students. The court entered an
injunction that required the schools to excuse objecting
students from participating in reading classes where the
textbooks were used and awarded the parents more than
$50,000 in damages. The plaintiffs had a variety of objections
to the reading series. Specifically, the plaintiffs believed that
the reading series taught "evolution, moral relativism,
internationalism (rather than patriotism), witchcraft, and
idolatry, and also 'denigrated the differences between the
sexes,' and disparaged parental control of children." 37 The
district court clearly held that "the [parents] believe that they
must not allow their children to be exposed to the content of
the [reading] series," and that "plaintiffs' religious beliefs
compel them to refrain from exposure to the [reading] series."38
Despite these clear holdings, the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding:
[T]he requirement that public school students study a basal
reader series chosen by the school authorities does not create
an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise Clause
when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief
to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or
required by their religion. 39
Even if the courts find that some aspect of the public school
curriculum creates a burden, the courts are far too quick to
accept the argument that the state's interest is strong enough
to outweigh the harm to the parents and the students. For
example, that was the position taken by one of the concurring
opinions in Mozert. The opinion agreed with evidence presented
at trial that "mandatory participation in reading classes using
the Holt series or some similar readers is essential to
accomplish" the state's objective of teaching students how to
think critically about complex and controversial subjects and to
develop their own ideas and make judgments about these

:n. George W. Dent, ,Jr., Reli~Iious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. HEY.
86:3, k66 (1988) (describing the Mozert plaintiffs' allegations).
:38. Mozert I, 617 I( Supp. at 1198, 1200.
:39. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (Mozert II), 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th
Cir. 1987).
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subjects, "and that this interest could not be achieved any other
way."40
In fact, some of the more extravagant statements in this
opinion are difficult to square with the existence of private
schools. If the state does have a compelling interest in
mandatory participation in a program of this sort, it is difficult
to imagine how the state could allow students to be educated in
private schools or in the home. It is one thing to say that the
state has an interest in an educated citizenry. It is quite
another to say that the state has the primary educational
responsibility, a responsibility that is superior to parental
judgments about the kind of upbringing their children receive.
The other concurring opinion in Mozert found that
mandatory participation in the reading series did constitute a
burden and rejected the view that the state had a compelling
interest in its reading program that could not be accomplished
by any other means. Yet, in the end, this judge concluded that
there had not been a free exercise violation because the
plaintiffs had the constitutionally protected option of choosing
a private school. As the judge put it, "the school board is
entitled to say, 'my way or the highway.'" 41
The First Circuit's 1995 decision in Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and
Safer Productions, Inc. is to the same effect. 42 In Brown, two
minors and their parents brought suit after the children were
compelled to attend a sexually explicit AIDS and sex education
program conducted at their public high school. 43 The plaintiffs
alleged that the program advocated and approved oral sex,
homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during
promiscuous premarital sex. 44 The district court dismissed the
complaint and the First Circuit affirmed. 45 The court of
appeals' conclusion was based on the view that although
parents generally have the right to control the education of
their children, that right could not be construed to interfere
with the government's decisions about the curriculum. 46 The
court stated:

10.
41.
12.
43.
14.
45.
16.

ld. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
ld. at 1071 (Boggs, J., concurring).
68 F.:3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995)
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 5:30, 511.
Id. at 5:31.
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If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to

dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the
schools would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student
whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the
school's choice of subject matter. We cannot see that the
Constitution imposes such a burden on state educational
systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents ... do
not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of
information in the public schools. 47

Nor, according to the court, did this program interfere with
plaintiffs' free exercise of their religion. 48 The plaintiffs' claim
for damages was properly dismissed because "the plaintiffs
[did] not allege that the one-time compulsory attendance at the
Program threatened their entire way of life." 49
The First Circuit's decision in Parker u. Hurley is more of
the same. In Parker, there were two groups of plaintiffs. The
court described the plaintiffs' contentions in this fashion:

5°

The Parkers object to their child being presented in
kindergarten and first grade with two books that portray
diverse families, including families in which both parents are
of the same gender. The Wirthlins object to a second-grade
teacher's reading to their son's class a book that depicts and
celebrates a gay marriage. 51

The plaintiffs did "not challenge the use of these books as
part of a nondiscrimination curriculum in the public schools,
but challenge the school district's refusal to provide them with
prior notice and to allow for exemption from such
instruction. "52
The Parker court rejected the parents' free exercise and due
process claims. With respect to the free exercise claim, the
court stated: "While we accept as true plaintiffs' assertion that
their sincerely held religious beliefs were deeply offended, we
find that they have not described a constitutional burden on
their rights, or on those of their children." 53 The court
distinguished Yoder because the Parker court did not think the

17.
18.
49.
50.
51.
52.
5:3.

!d.
!d. at 5:l9.
/d.
511 F.:ld H7 (1st Cir. 2008).
/d. at 90.
/d.
/d. at 99.
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plaintiffs in Parker had alleged the same devastating impact on
their religion. 54 According to the court, "[e]xposure to the
materials in dispute here will not automatically and
irreversibly prevent the parents from raising" 55 their children
in their religious beliefs. With respect to the due process claim,
the court acknowledged that Supreme Court cases such as
Meyer and Pierce had supported parental rights. The court
found, though, that this parental right did not extend to
"'direct[ing] how a public school teaches their child."' 56 The
court concluded that the due process clause did "not give
plaintiffs the degree of control over their children's education
that their requested relief seeks." 57
The Parker court also considered and rejected a combined
due process and free exercise claim. ss The basis for this
conclusion was that the plaintiffs had not presented an
argument that there was any direct coercion. 59 In addition, the
court also rejected the argument that the school was
unconstitutionally indoctrinating the plaintiffs' children. 60 The
parents retained the opportunity to instruct their children
differently. 61 The "indoctrination" in Parker was relatively mild
(the court here returned to the idea that there was no
cognizable burden involved) and did not amount to "systemic
indoctrination." 62 According to the court, "ft]he reading by a
teacher of one book, or even three, and even if to a young and
impressionable child, does not constitute 'indoctrination."' 63
As Parker demonstrates, the current situation is quite
bleak, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law. 64 There

54. Jd. at 99-100.
55. !d. at 100.
56. /d. at 101 (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 101 F.:ld :lSI, :395
(6th Cir. 2005)).
57. Jd. at 102-03.
58. ld. at 105.
59. !d.
60. Jd.
61. /d.
62. Jd. at 106.
6:1. hi. at 107.
61. There are other cases to the same effect. See, e.g., C.N. v. Hidgcwood Bd. of
Educ., 180 F.8d 159 (:ld Cir. 2005); Leebacrt v. Harrington. :l:l2 F.:ld 1:31 (2d Cir. 200:3);
Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.:1d 680 (7th Cir. 1991); Fields v. Palmdale
Sch. Dist., 427 F.:ld 1197 (9th Cir.), amended and r('affirmed, 117 F.:ld 1187 (9th Cir.
2005).
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seems to be little prospect of the United States Supreme Court
changing this situation.

III. ASSESSMENT
This section of the paper will evaluate the courts' treatment
of the free exercise (part A. 1.) and substantive due process
(part A. 2.) claims. In my view, the recent court decisions
reflect a defensible reading of the relevant constitutional
provisions and precedents. I will then (part B.) evaluate the
current legal situation from a parental rights perspective. I will
also discuss (part C.) some solutions to this situation.

A.

Legal Doctrine

1. Free Exercise
Under current law, the free exercise claim of parents who
object to the curriculum in the public schools is not strong. In
general, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
provides very little judicially enforceable protection against
state laws that mandate conduct that might be viewed as
interfering with religious liberty. If the state requirement is a
'"neutral law of general applicability,"' 65 then (under current
law) there is no realistic argument that the Constitution
provides any basis to resist the mandate.
The leading case is Employment Division v. Smith. 66 Smith
involved two individuals who were denied unemployment
compensation because of work-related misconduct. 67 The
workers were fired from their jobs with a drug rehabilitation
organization due to their use of peyote, an illegal drug, even
though they used peyote for religious purposes. 68 The United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
concluded that Oregon could "include religiously inspired
peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibitions
on use of that drug .... "69 To allow an exemption from laws

65.
455 U.S.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Emp't Div. v. Smith, 191 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee,
252, 26:3 n.:l (1982) (Stevens, .J., concurring)).
Id.
Jd. at 871.
Jd.
Id.
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prohibiting "socially harmful conduct" 70 would allow an
individual with a religious objection to such laws "'to become a
law unto himself."' 71
Under this approach, so long as the state mandate is a
neutral law of general applicability, then there is no prospect of
a court finding that someone with a religious objection to the
mandate is exempted from the mandate.
One seeking an exemption from such a mandate would be
limited to seeking an exemption from the legislature. 72 Justice
Scalia noted that "leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in." 73 He concluded,
though, "that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which conscience
is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs." 74
Under this view, the right of parents to opt-out of an
objectionable portion of the curriculum would fail. Smith is a
controversial ruling but I believe that it was correctly decided.
The argument for a constitutionally compelled exemption ought
to fail.
I think that, properly interpreted, the free exercise clause
only prohibits laws that intentionally discriminate against
religion, not laws that have the effect of interfering with the
free exercise of religion. 75 This view of the free exercise clause
is the one with the most support in the text and history of the
Constitution 76 and with the current emphasis in constitutional
law on the almost always decisive importance of legislative
purpose. 77 It is also the view that has prevailed for most of the
long history of judicial interpretation of the free exercise
clause. The exception, of course, was the period between 1963
and 1990 (during the Sherbert- Yoder era) but it is important to

70.
71.
72.
73.
71.
75.
76.
77.

ld. at 8il5.
!d. (quoting J{cynolds v. United States, 91-l U.S. ];15, 167 (li'l79)).
!d. at 890.
ld.
!d.
See Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1 :l!l.
ld.
/d.
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note that that relatively brief interlude did not provide
significant protection for religious practice. 78
There is some room to argue that the basic approach in
Smith (no exemption from a neutral law of general
applicability) does not apply. If the public school curriculum
was not truly a "neutral law of general applicability," then
Smith's restrictive rule would not apply. But if the school
imposed an across the board requirement that students
participate in the curriculum, then Smith will control. There is
also a potential argument that the parents with a religious
objection to the public school curriculum can establish a socalled hybrid rights claim. 79 This argument, which has recently
been described by a leading scholar in this area as of "limited
practical significance," 80 is unlikely to provide support for a
claim when the free exercise or substantive due process claims
would not succeed independently.
In theory, there might be an argument that the "my way or
the highway" situation creates a burden on the free exercise of
religion. Parents who want to exercise their constitutional right
to send their children to a religious school are faced with the
choice of foregoing a valuable public benefit (a free public
education) or violating what for some may be a religious
obligation to choose religious schooling. I think it is fair to view
this as a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right. 81
There is very little prospect, however, that the federal courts
will accept this argument. Recent Establishment Clause
decisions make it possible for the government to provide
assistance (such as vouchers) that enables certain parents to
choose a private education, but, as decisions such as Locke v.
Davey make clear, 82 this is viewed as a matter of legislative
grace and not as constitutional mandate. This failure is

78. A careful review of the cases reveals that under Sherbert and Yoder review
was "strict in theory but feeble in fact." Christopher L. Eis!,rruber & Lawnmce G. Sager,
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.I{EV. 1215, 1247 (1991) (footnote omitted).
79. This was how the Smith Court distinguished Yoder. See Smith, 491 U.S. at
881-82. There is a vast literature on hybrid rights. Sec, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J.
Strang, When a "Rule" /Joesn't Rule: The failure of the Oregon l~mployment Division v.
Smith "Hybrid Rixhts Exception," 108 PENN. ST. L. I{EV. 578 (20D:1).
80. DANII<;L 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 107 (2d ed.
2009).
81. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 175.
82. Locke v. Davey, 510 U.S. 712 (2001).
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lamentable but I do not think there is any prospect of a court
finding that the current situation is unconstitutional.

2. Substantive Due Process
The recent courts that have considered parental rights
arguments in disputes about the curriculum in public schools
have rejected the substantive due process arguments. Despite
the general support for a parental right to control education,
most courts have interpreted this general right not to extend to
the particular choice of a parent to opt-out of a portion of the
public school curricul urn. 83
In my view, this conclusion is probably correct as a matter
of due process. The whole idea of substantive due process ought
to be rejected. 84 Meyer and Pierce were Lochne/' 5 -era decisions
that relied on the doctrine of substantive due process. Although
there were religious aspects to these decisions, Meyer and
Pierce were decided before the Court had incorporated the
religion clauses and the decisions were clearly based on
substantive due process. With the repudiation of Lochner, these
decisions, to the extent that they depend solely on the due
process argument, ought to have been abandoned as well.
Even if the whole doctrine of substantive due process ought
not to be rejected, it is probably true that the substantive due
process "right" involved ought not to extend to the parental
choice involved. There is a significant debate about how to
define the scope of the rights protected by the doctrine of
substantive due process. 86 The narrow approach to this issue
reflected in cases such as Washington u. Glucksberg8 7 is the
most defensible. Yet, this approach likely provides little
support for a claim to opt-out of a portion of the public school
curriculum. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Fields u. Palmdale

8::3. See, e.g, Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 117 F.:ld 1187. 1189-90 (9th Cir.
2006).
84. See RichardS. Myers, The End of Substantive /Jue Process(, 15 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 557 (1988). Nut see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Oriuinalist /Jefense of

Substantive Due Process: Mauna Carta, Hiuher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth
Amendment, 58 EMORY L..J. 5il5 (2009).
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 15 (1905).
86. See generally Richard S. Myers, Pope John Paul /!, Freedom, and
Constitutional Law, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 61, 62-77 (2007) (discussing the dPbate about
the differing understandings of substantive chw process).
87. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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School District,'I'.X the "Meyer-Pierce right ... does not include
the 'right to restrict the flow of information in the public
schools.' ... Indeed, parents 'do not have a fundamental ...
right generally to direct how a public school teaches their
child.'"x 9 In considering this argument, the courts examine
whether the claimed right is deeply rooted in our nation's
history and tradition. Parents do, it is true, have some limited
opportunity to opt-out of the public school curriculum (this is
typically permitted by state statutes dealing with sex
education 90) but I do not think this would support a more
general right to opt-out.
There is some argument for a broader approach to
substantive due process. The Court does not always limit the
scope of the doctrine to specifically defined rights with deep
historical rights. 91 It is possible to generalize from the broad
language in Yoder to support the parental right involved in
these curriculum cases. In Yoder, the Court stated: "The
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition." 92 It is not too great a leap
from this approach to the right claimed by the parents in cases
such as Parker. For this argument to succeed, courts would
have also have to take a different approach to the burden issue
than the courts did in cases such as Mozert, Brown, and Parker.
The courts do in certain contexts demonstrate more sensitivity
to the burdens placed upon those asserting constitutional
claims (e.g., in the Establishment Clause cases involving
religious exercises in public schools or the display of religious
symbols 93 ) and so there is some hope that this argument might
prevail. I believe, however, that the clear direction of federal

88. 127 F. :3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), amended and reaffirmed, 14 7 F.3d 1187 (9th
Cir. 2005).
89. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 117 F.:id 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
90. See Kevin Rogers & Richard Fossey symposium piece.
91. See Myers, supra note 81, at 67-72.
92. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 106 U.S. 205, 2:12 (1972).
9:1. See Myers, Civic Virtue, supra note 1, at 85; Myers, J>arental Control, supra
note 1, at 1:!7.
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courts of appeals decisions on this topic indicates that there is
little likelihood of this broader argument prevailing.

B.

Evaluation

The current legal situation with regard to parental control
over education is troublesome. The current legal approach is
heavily weighted towards state power. As one commentator
noted in defending the Mozert case:
[T]he entire concept of compulsory education is based upon
the assumption that there are times when the state rather
than the parent may decide what perspectives the child
confronts. Although society normally assumes that parents
are best able to determine and do what is best for their child,
compulsory education traditionally has been justified as a
mechanism to expose children to ideas that will enable them
to advance beyond the home and transcend the prejudices of
the past. [According to this commentator,] [t]o compel
education, especially education under state control or
supervision, is to assert that the state-rather than parentsultimately should decide what is best for children. 94

I think it is important to recognize this reality. There is
inevitably a fair amount of compulsion in the public schools. 95
And, because of inequities in funding, many parents do not
have a realistic option to avoid the public schools by sending
their children to private schools or by exercising the choice to
home school. 96
My perspective on these issues is informed by Catholic
social thought, which takes a very different approach. The
Church emphasizes the primary rights of parents, the
importance of the doctrine of subsidiarity, and a sensitivity to

91. Stanley Ingber, Reli!{ion or Jdeolo!{y: A Needed Clarification of the Reli!{ion
Clauses, 11 STAN. L. H":v. 2:3:3, 298 (191l9) (footnotes omitted). For a commentary on the
hazards of this sort of strong emphasis on state control over education, see Michael A
Scaperlanda, Producing 'l'rousered Apes in Dwyer:~ Totalitarian State, 7 TEX. RIW. L. &
POL. 1 73 (2002); Michael i\. Scaperlanda, Realism, Freedom, and the !nte!{ral
Development of the Human Person: A Catholic View of 8ducation, 11 .J. CA'J'H. LECAL
STUD. 65 (2005).
95. Myers, Civic Virtue, supra note L at s:l.
96. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 17:l-76.
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the impact of funding_9 7 The Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith summarized Church teaching in this fashion:
The task of educating belongs fundamentally and primarily to
the family. The function of the State is subsidiary: its role is
to guarantee, protect, promote and supplement. Whenever the
State lays claim to an educational monopoly, it oversteps its
rights and offends justice. It is parents who have the right to
choose the school to which they send their children and the
right to set up and support educational centres in accordance
with their own beliefs. The State cannot without injustice
merely tolerate so-called private schools. Such schools render
a public service and therefore have a right to financial
assistance. 9 X
The Church's approach to parental control of education
supports a parental right to opt-out of a portion of the
curriculum. The 1983 Charter of the Rights of the Family
stated: "Parents have the right to ensure that their children
are not compelled to attend classes which are not in agreement
with their own moral and religious convictions." 99 The Church's
social teaching properly regards the "my way or the highway"
approach reflected in the constitutional law of the United
States as an injustice. As the Compendium of the Social
Doctrine of the Church summarizes this point:
Public authorities must see to it that "public subsidies are so
allocated that parents are truly free to exercise this right
without incurring unjust burdens. Parents should not have to
sustain, directly or indirectly, extra charges which would
deny or unjustly limit the exercise of this freedom." The
refusal to provide public economic support to non-public
schools that need assistance and that render a service to civil
society is to be considered an injustice. 100

97. See !{i'nerally Patrick McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Societies: The
Case of Lasallians, Families, Schools-and the Poor, 45 ,J. CATH. LECAL STUD. 131
(2006).

98. The Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Christian Freedom
and Liberation #91 (1986), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/
documents/rc__ con_ cfaith doc_19860:l22_freedom -liheration_en.html.
99. Charter of the Rights of the Family, art. 5(c) (198:3), http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documcnts/rc_pc_family _doc_198:l1 022_familyrights_en.html. See also Pontifical Council for the Family, The Family and Human
Rights
(1999),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/
documcnts/rc_pc_family_doc_20001115family-human-rights_en.html.
100. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine
of the Church #211 (2004) (quoting The Charter of the Hights of the Family, art. 5(h)
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There would of course be limits to the parental right. The
Church's teaching does not regard rights as absolute. 101 But
the limits would need to be quite narrow. In Yoder, the Court
mentioned that "the power of the parent ... may be subject to
limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have potential for
significant social burdens." 102 Yet, the cases seem to be far
more deferential to state power, at least when parents have not
opted out of the public schools. I would take the view that the
state ought to be able to intervene when there has been a
serious showing that parental choices were causing harm. 103

C.

Solutions

1. Rebuild culture
The problem presented for parents whose children attend
public schools is that there will inevitably be clashes over basic
issues. The best long-term solution is to rebuild the culture so
that these clashes are minimized. 104 The situation in Parker is
only presented because significant segments of the population
believe it is a good idea to promote the legitimacy of same-sex
marriage. Interestingly, the amici in Parker were worried
about the exodus from the classrooms if the plaintiffs in Parker
were granted relief. 105 Apparently that is due to their
recognition that not everyone agrees with that moral position.
This particular problem (with parents objecting to the
promotion of same sex marriage) would not arise if a
traditional understanding of marriage were restored. But I am
not optimistic about that strategy in the short run. Because of
the increasing pluralism in our society, the strategy of trying to
build up a proper understanding of morality is not likely to
(198:3) ), http://www. vatican. va/roman_ curi a/pon ti fica!_ cou nci I s/justpeace/ docum en ts/rc_
pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
1OJ. See Hi chard S. Myers, Current Legal Issues Regarding Rights of Conscience in
Health Care, 16 ,JOSEI'HINUM J. THEOLOOY :l91, 10:l-01 (2009) (noting the Catholic
Church's understanding of the limits on the right of religious liberty).
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 106 U.S. 205, 2:J:l-:i1 (1972).
103. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 176.
101. See generally Myers, Conscience. supra note 1, at 1:n-:lil; Myers, supra note
84, at 405.
105. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.:ld 87, 96 n.8 (2008) ("Amici, however, argue that
such exemptions would significantly burden the schoob because (1) there would be an
exodus from classrooms if plaintiffs received the relief requested and that (2) this in
turn would send a message that children of same-sex partners are inferior.").
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succeed any time soon. Some of these problems are less likely
to arise in certain communities. There are many parts of the
country where support for same-sex marriage is not
widespread. It is a good thing, I believe, that we still have a
significant amount of decentralization with regard to schooling.
But this does not deal with the problems for parents who are
faced with the dilemmas faced by the parents in Parker. Their
plight would be best solved by restoring a traditional
understanding of marriage, although that is a long-term
cultural strategy.

2. Other remedies
In the meantime, because the federal constitutional
arguments are so weak, other remedies need to be pursued. It
is often possible to obtain sub-constitutional exemptions. It is
worth recalling that legislative protection for conscientious
objection to government mandates is long-standing and, I
think, far more secure. 106 I think that is true in many contexts
and also in the particular issue under review-the area of
parental rights. The federal constitutional objections to sex
education are typically rejected but there are statutory
protections for parental rights in most states. 107 We sometimes
forget that decisions such as Smith have been reversed by
legislation. 1ox In general, religious claimants fare better
outside the courts. 109 This is a second-best strategy, as I
pointed out in a recent paper on health care rights of
conscience, 110 but such a strategy is necessary to protect
religious freedom while the long-term cultural strategy is
pursued.

106. Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1::l5.
107. See Rogers & Fossey symposium piece. See also Erie A DeGroff, Parental
Riuhts and Public School Curricula: Reuisitinf{ Mozert After 20 years, il8 J.L. & EDUC.
8:l. 129-:lO (2009) (noting that public schools often have opt-out provisions and that
these seem to work without significant difficulty).
108. Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1:l5.
109. Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1:l5. The legal status of home schooling is
a good example. Home schooling advocates did not have a lot of success in the courts.
See id. at 1:15 n.81; Myers, Parental Control. supra note 1, at 1.15-:l6. However, as a
result primarily of legislative changes, home schooling is now quite secure. Myers,
Conscience, supra note 1, at 1 :l5 n.81.
110. Myers, supra note 81, at 107.
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3. More equitable funding
Perhaps a better strategy is to pursue genuine pluralism
with regard to education. This would require a more equitable
funding system. 111 I am not optimistic about the success of this
approach, either as a matter of constitutional law or as a
prudential policy option. Perhaps the serious, increasing
clashes about same-sex marriage will prompt some movement
in favor of school choice.

IV. CONCLUSION
The current legal situation involving parental rights with
regard to controlling the education of their children is quite
bleak as a matter of federal constitutional law. The only real
constitutional right of parents is to opt-out of the public school
system altogether. Parents have very little right to opt-out of
particular courses or classes, even when such curriculum
offerings interfere with the religious freedom of parents and
their children.
The solutions to this plight are not very promising. The
existing legal doctrines do not offer much support and, in any
event, I do not believe that either the Free Exercise or Due
Process clauses, properly interpreted, should offer much
support. The solutions I mentioned-rebuilding the culture,
pursuing other remedies for conscience, and encouraging an
emphasis on school choice with a focus on equitable fundingare more long-term. None of these seems to offer much of a
prospect of immediate relief, although the legislative
exemption strategy offers some prospect of success. Perhaps,
though, the recent intense controversies about same-sex
marriage will prompt an increasing focus on school choice.

111. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 17:l-76.

